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order to continue operations and to require it to justify them as rea-
sonable before a district court should the unions or the Government
bring a suit for injunctive relief.
The procedure sanctioned by the Supreme Court may have two ill
effects. Firstly, it may result in interruptions to interstate commerce,
since struck carriers might be unable to operate during the period in
which they would be seeking approval of proposed changes.a 6 Second-
ly, it may create a bargaining imbalance in favor of unions, for a
struck carrier might be forced to settle on union terms rather than
suffer a work stoppage pending approval of changes.r-
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that any possible ill effects
of procedural aspects of the holding in Railway Clerks do not militate
against the significance of the basic determination that a struck railroad
or airline may make reasonably necessary temporary changes without
following the statutory processes of negotiation and mediation. The
scope of a struck carrier's right to attempt to operate has been defined
at last by the highest court of the land.
RAYMOND J. LAJEUNESSE, JR.
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS
Evidencing great concern over a strong trend toward concentration
via merger in the American economy,' Congress in 1950 enacted the
Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger bill, amending section 7 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1914.2 The amendment allows the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which are responsible for
56Cf. cases cited note 53 supra and accompanying text.
57Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-500 (1960); Flight
Eng'rs Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963).
1" 'That the current merger movement [during the years 1940-1947] has had a
significant effect on the economy is clearly revealed by the fact that the asset
value of the companies which have disappeared through mergers amounts to
5.2 billion dollars, or no less than 5.5 percent of the total assets of all manufacturing
corporations-a significant segment of the economy to be swallowed up in a short
period of time."' H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 as quoted in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 n.27 (1962).21n pertinent part, amended § 7 now reads: "No corporation engaged in com-
merce ... shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 Star. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. 18 (1964),
amending 38 Star. 731 (1914).
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the enforcement of section 7, to attack mergers-corporate combina-
tions formed by the acquisition of assets.3 To establish a violation of
section 7, the complainant must allege and prove that there is a rea-
sonable probability4 that the acquisition will result in a substantial5
lessening of competition in any line of commerce.
Section 7, as amended in 1950, applies to horizontal, vertical, and
conglomerate mergers.6 A horizontal merger involves the acquisition
of the assets of a competitor-one engaged in a similar business at
the same level of the production or distribution process as the acquiring
corporation. A vertical merger involves the acquisition of the assets
of a customer or supplier at a different level of the production or dis-
tribution process. A conglomerate merger is, simply, an acquisition
which is neither vertical nor horizontal-one in which the acquired
corporation is neither customer, supplier, nor competitor of the acquir-
ing corporation.
3Prior to the 1950 amendment, § 7 applied only to acquisitions of stock or other
share capital which might substantially lessen competition, and the entire purpose
of the section could be circumvented by direct purchase of assets. "'The purpose
of the proposed legislation is to prevent corporations from acquiring another
corporation by means of the acquisition of its assets, whereunder [sic] the present
law it is prohibited from acquiring the stock of said corporation. Since the ac-
quisition of stock is significant chiefly because it is likely to result in control
of the underlying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchase of the same assets has
been inconsistent and paradoxical as to the over-all effect of existing law."' S.
REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 as quoted in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 316 n.29 (1962).
4The legislative history of the 1950 amendment indicates that Congress used the
words "may be substantially to lessen competition" [emphasis added] to emphasize
its concern with probabilities, not certainties or mere possibilities. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). Thus, a § 7 violation does not
exist upon a mere possibility that substantial injury to competition will occur. Nor
is it a defense to a § 7 complaint that actual injury to competition has not oc-
curred.
SCongress provided no definite qualitative or quantitative tests for determining
the substantiality of a restraint on competition, but indicated that each acquisition
must be viewed functionally in the context of its particular line of commerce.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962). The House Report on H.R. 2734
stated that substantial lessening of competition might be inferred from "findings,
for example, that a whole or material part of the competitive activity of an
enterprise, which had been a substantial factor in competition, had been eliminated;
that the relative size of the acquiring corporation had increased to such a point
that its advantage over competitors threatened to be 'decisive'; that an 'undue'
number of competing enterprises had been eliminated; or that buyers and sellers
in the relevant market had established relationships depriving their rivals of a
fair opportunity to compete." Id. at 321 n.36 citing H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8.
GSee Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 817 (1962).
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Since 1950 vigorous prosecution of section 7 has resulted in a line of
United States Supreme Court cases that has established elaborate
boundaries of legality for horizontal7 and vertical8 acquisitions. How-
ever, statistics indicate that the great majority of acquisitions today
are conglomerate in nature, rather than vertical or horizontal Con-
cerned about this new third wave of concentration, the Federal Trade
Commission is attempting to establish authoritative guidelines for deal-
ing with the conglomerate merger.10
On August 1, 1957, Procter & Gamble Company, the largest do-
mestic manufacturer of household cleaning products,1 acquired Clorox
Chemical Company, the largest producer of household liquid bleach
(hereinafter referred to as HLB).12 On September 30, 1957,1' the Fed-
eral Trade Commission filed a complaint, alleging that the acquisition
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act and on November 26, 1963,
issued its final order, invalidating the merger.14 Procter & Gamble ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
which, on M'arch 18, 1966, set aside the Commission's order and dis-
missed the complaint. 15 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on October 16, 1966.16 Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC may
have a significant impact on conglomerate merger policy, because the
manner in which the Court of Appeals disposed of the complaint has
afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to answer an important
7See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
SSee Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v.
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
9See Address by FTC Commissioner John R. Reilly, Chicago Chapter Federal
Bar Association Annual Meeting, June 13, 1966, in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 50,147
(1966).
10" 'Clearly, what is needed in this increasingly important type of merger
activity is more of the case-by-case exploration which has already provided such
useful guides in respect to horizontal and vertical mergers.'" 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
50,147 at p. 55,101 (1966).
111n addition, Procter & Gamble manufactured and sold food products, sham-
poos, dentrifices, home permanents and paper products. Its assets exceeded one-
half billion dollars; its annual sales exceeded one billion dollars. Procter & Gamble
Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74,78 (6th Cir. 1966).
12Clorox, with assets of over twelve million dollars and annual sales of slightly
less than forty million dollars, controlled 48.8% of the household liquid bleach
market. Id. at 78-79.
133 Trade Reg. Rep. Dkt. No. 6901 at 25,400 (1966).
141bid.
15358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
16Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 385
U.s. 897 (1966).
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question: What significance is to be attached to the classification of a
merger as conglomerate?
The Supreme Court has decided two cases bearing on this question,
but neither decision has clearly answered it.
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,17 the Supreme Court invali-
dated the acquisition of a food products corporation by a wholesale-
retail grocery network. The Court characterized the merger as con-
glomerate and invalidated it because it fostered reciprocal buying op-
portunities. Yet it would seem that companies encountering each
other as seller and buyer would, at least arguably, establish the custo-
mer-supplier relationship necessary to classify a merger as vertical.
Since the Court did not address itself to this question, alternative con-
clusions may be drawn from the decision: either (1) the Court regards
reciprocal buying as having no vertical anti-competitive effect; or
(2) the Court does not consider the distinction between vertical and
conglomerate mergers to be absolute, so a merger may be conglom-
erate, yet have vertical implications.
In United States v. Continental Can Co.,' s the Supreme Court in-
validated the acquisition of a large producer of glass containers by a
large producer of metal containers. The district court, in upholding
the merger, characterized it as conglomerate, and evaluated its effects
in terms of the impact on the glass container market and the metal
container market, considered separately.19 But the Supreme Court
found that "meaningful competition" 20 existed between glass con-
tainers and metal containers and that this competition was within the
"competition-preserving proscriptions of section 7." 21 The Court did
not expressly classify the merger as either horizontal (among com-
petitors) or conglomerate; so alternative conclusions are again avail-
able: either (1) the Court, by finding direct competition, impliedly
classified the merger as horizontal; or (2) the Court did not consider
the distinction between horizontal and conglomerate mergers to be
absolute, so a merger may be conglomerate, yet have horizontal impli-
cations.
Summarily, the important question left unresolved by these two
cases may be stated thus: Is the classification of a merger as con-
glomerate to be accorded legal significance-that is, are con-
glomerate mergers to be regarded as a distinct analytical class for sec-
17380 U.S. 592 (1965).
18378 U.S. 441 (1964).
19217 F. Supp. 761 (SD.N.Y. 1963).
20United States v. Continental Can Co, 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964).
211d. at 454.
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tion 7 purposes; or is conglomerate merely a convenient economic
frame of reference used to describe mergers that are neither con-
ventionally horizontal nor conventionally vertical? This is the question
that the Supreme Court has an opportunity to resolve in Procter &
Gamble.
In the Court of Appeals, both parties agreed to a stipulation that the
relevant line of commerce was the national HLB market and a series of
regional markets.22 The parties further stipulated that, prior to the
merger, Procter & Gamble had never been a customer, supplier, or
competitor in the HLB market.23 Thus, the merger was characterized
as conglomerate, and the Federal Trade Commission assumed the bur-
den of proving that Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Clorox created
the probability that competition would be substantially lessened in the
manufacture and distribution of HLB.
Arguing that HLB is closely related to Procter & Gamble's house-
hold lines, both from the consumer point of view and in marketing
techniques, the Commission characterized this acquisition as a product-
extension merger. As the Commission said in its brief:
By identifying the Clorox acquisition as a "product-extension"
merger, and so distinguishing it, for example, from a truly con-
glomerate acquisition involving totally unrelated products, the
Commission has delineated those salient chara~teristics of the in-
stant type of merger which are most likely to give rise to anti-
competitive consequences, namely, the identity of the techniques
in marketing and distribution and the similarity in use of the prod-
ucts of the acquired and acquiring firms.2 4
The Commission argued that this close affinity between HLB and
Procter & Gamble's products would enable Procter & Gamble to em-
ploy its "size, financial strength, experience, and investment in dis-
tribution, advertising, promotion, and marketing" to substantial ad-
vantage in the HLB industry.25
Noting that "Clorox and the bleaches sold by the other principal
manufacturers are chemically identical . . . not protected by patents
or secret processes, and that special machinery and equipment are not
involved in the manufacture of Clorox or the other bleaches," the
Commission concluded that Clorox owed its dominant position in
22358 F.2d at 79.
23Ibid.
24Brief for Respondent, p. 49 n.59.
251d. at 49.
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the HLB industry to advertising and promotion. 26 Further, because
of the close relationship between Procter & Gamble's products and
HLB, Procter & Gamble could easily channel its mammoth advertising
and promotion resources into the HLB market 2 7 For example, Procter
& Gamble's huge advertising expenditures, which in 1957 exceeded
those of any other United States company, would qualify it for
"substantial discounts in purchasing television and magazine advertis-
ing." '2 Having joined forces with Procter & Gamble, Clorox could
now be included in Procter & Gamble's large-scale, multi-product
promotions, and the cost could be spread over Procter & Gamble's
other products.
29
In addition to the promotional advantages, the Commission noted
that Clorox would no longer have to rely on independent brokers for
distribution of its bleach because it could now use Procter & Gamble's
sales force "which calls on the same grocery store outlets that sell
Clorox." 30
The Commission further pointed out that HLB is a product that
fits well within Procter & Gamble's experience in manufacturing and
marketing household products: "The acquisition dovetailed with Proc-
ter's policies of furthering its continued growth and diversification into
related low-price, high-turnover consumer household goods ... ,, 31
The Commission concluded that it was probable that Procter &
Gamble would commit "so much of its vast resources and marketing
techniques as may be necessary to fortify and enlarge Clorox's near-
monopoly position and defeat new competitors .... ,, 32 This, argued
the Commission, would be a substantial lessening of competition with-
in the meaning of section 7.P
The elimination of a potential competitor is one of the bases upon
which a merger may be invalidated. 34 The Commission concluded








33Note that the House Report on H.R. 2734, note 5 supra, indicated that sub-
stantial lessening of competition might be inferred from the fact that the relevant
size of the merged corporation had increased to such a point that its advantage
over competitors threatened to be "decisive."
3 4See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Ekco
Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
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allied products through the same stores to the same customers," a5
Procter & Gamble was the prime prospective entrant to the HLB
market.36 In bolstering its contention that Procter & Gamble was a
potential rival of Clorox (and had eliminated itself as a competitor by
acquiring Clorox), the Commission reiterated in its reply brief that
"Clorox was sold to the same customers, at the same stores and by the
same merchandising methods as Procter's household cleansing agents,
and that Procter possessed both the resources and technical skill neces-
sary for the successful marketing of liquid bleach." 37
In this particular case, it seems that strong argument could be made
for the proposition that this is a horizontal merger; that is, that the
products of Procter & Gamble and Clorox are directly competitive.
Throughout its brief, submitted to the Court of Appeals, the Federal
Trade Commission emphasized the similarities between the production
and marketing facilities of Procter & Gamble and of Clorox. More-
over, the Commission continually alluded to the close functional re-
lationship between the products of the two companies, pointing out
that, aside from the anti-competitive effects in the HLB market,
Procter & Gamble would receive significant promotional and distri-
butional advantages in marketing its household cleaning products.3 8
Under the doctrines of United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank'
and United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,40 Procter & Gamble would
seem almost certain to lose this case if the merger were characterized
as horizontal.
In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank the Supreme Court noted:
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward concen-
tration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof
of market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive
effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a
35Brief for Respondent at p. 63.
36"The close affinity between liquid bleach and household cleansing agents,
and Procter's eagerness to enter the bleach market are convincing proof that
Procter was one of the most important potential competitors ... " Id. at 58.
3?Reply Brief for Respondent, p. 17.
3s"Conversely, Procter has obtained the added advantage of being able to use
the valuable Clorox name to promote the sale of its soaps, detergents and cleaners
in competition with such companies as Colgate-Palmolive, Lever Brothers, Purex,
and B.T. Babbitt. . . . Clorox can now be tied into these promotions, thereby
affecting competition not only in liquid bleach sales but also in sales of soaps,
detergents and cleansers. Thus, the Commission was fully warranted in finding
that the acquisition may enable Procter to strengthen its position in other allied
markets." Brief for Respondent, pp. 52-53.
89374 U.S. 321 (1963).
40384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant mar-
ket, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-
competitive effects.41
The Court went on to indicate that it was clear that 30 per cent
would constitute such an undue share of the relevant market as to
render the merger inherently likely to lessen competition. 42
Von's Grocery Co. involved a horizontal merger between two retail
grocery companies. Von's, the acquiring company, was the third
largest firm in the relevant market, with a 4.7 per cent share.43
Shopping Bag, the acquired company, was sixth, with a 4.2 per cent
share.4 The four largest firms had 24.4 per cent of the market; the
top eight had 40.9 per cent.45 The Supreme Court stated that this was
simply a case of two powerful companies merging in a way which
would make them more powerful than ever before and invalidated
the merger.46
In Procter & Gamble, the Commission indicated that three firms, of
which Procter & Gamble was the leader, controlled 80 per cent of
the household cleansing agent industry.4 In light of Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank and Von's Grocery Co., Procter & Gamble's share of the
market would certainly be such that any acquisition within this field
would violate section 7. Moreover, the acquisition of Clorox's 48.8
per cent of the household liquid bleach market would certainly rep-
resent a significant increase in Procter's market power.
However, the Commission agreed to a product-market definition
which tends to prevent classification of the merger as horizontal. To
understand the tactic employed by the Commission, it is necessary
to reexamine the context in which the case arose. As mentioned pre-
viously, a line of United States Supreme Court cases has defined
boundaries of legality for horizontal mergers.48 These boundaries are
extremely limited, so that the horizontal merger is rapidly disappear-
41374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
421d. at 364.




47Brief for Respondent, p. 14.
48United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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ing from the scene and no longer represents an enforcement problem
for the Federal Trade Commission. However, there has been a cor-
responding rise in conglomerate mergers for which boundaries of
legality have not yet been determined. As stated by Federal Trade
Commissioner Reilly:
It seems to me that to continue to emphasize action against hori-
zontal mergers would be like mounting a vast hunting expedition
for stalking the dinosaur. He just isn't there anymore. On the
other hand it seems difficult to deny that enforcement activity
is lagging in the major problem area, conglomerate mergers.49
According to Commissioner Reilly, it is the conglomerate merger that
should be at the center of policy planning for merger enforcement.40
If the Commission is seeking to establish authoritative guidelines for
conglomerate mergers, it must prosecute conglomerate mergers. Since
there is very little established conglomerate merger policy, the Com-
mission may be expected to prosecute those cases in which it can take
maximum advantage of the very strict standards that are applied to
horizontal mergers. This is the context in which Procter & Gamble
must be viewed.
General Foods Corp., in which the Commission struck down a
product-extension acquisition by General Foods of the S.O.S. Co.,
provides an example of the manner in which the Commission intended
to use Procter & Gamble.51 The majority of the Commission ruled
that General Foods' acquisition of S.O.S. was a product-extension
merger "identical in all respects" to the Procter & Gamble acquisition
of Clorox, and listed the same anti-competitive effects that it had re-
lied on in Procter & Gamble, drawing parallel conclusions in each
instance. At the conclusion of its opinion, the Commission set forth
an appendix entitled "Comparison of Operative Facts in the General
Foods and Procter & Gamble Cases," which indicated thirty-seven
points of similarity between the two cases.52
Commissioner Elmen, dissenting, stated that he could not regard
this case as a "mere replica" of Procter & Gamble.53 The Commis-
sioner refused to ignore the differences between the two cases, argu-
49Address by FTC Commissioner Reilly, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 50, 147 at p. 55, 179
(1966).
5Olbid.
51General Foods was the largest producer of packaged food in the United
States; S.O.S. controlled 51% of the household steel wool market. 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. 1 17,465 (1963).
523 Trade Reg. Rep. $ 17,465 at p. 22,732 (1963).
531d. at 22,745.
CASE COMMENTS
ing that, although both acquisitions could be generally described as
product-extension mergers, the label cannot resolve the question of
legality., The Commissioner distinguished the two fact situations on
the general basis that there were no horizontal implications in General
Foods, and refused to regard the two cases as analogousYr-
To obtain an effective tool for dealing with fact situations such as
General Foods, which have no horizontal effects, the Federal Trade
Commission characterized the Procter & Gamble merger, with its hori-
zontal effects, as conglomerate. By so doing the Commission has
necessarily rejected any notion that conglomerates are a legally dis-
tinct merger class. The Commission describes the Procter & Gamble
fact situation as a product-extension acquisition which, while falling
in the general class of conglomerate mergers, is really only a variation
of the conventional horizontal merger.G Thus, the classification of
a merger as conglomerate, while perhaps useful as an economic defini-
tion, imports no legal distinction under section 7.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in uphold-
ing Procter & Gamble's acquisition, rejected each basis upon which
the Commission attempted to predicate a violation of section 7. The
court attributed Clorox's dominant market position to widespread
acceptance and preference of its product, rather than to extensive
advertising.57 The court pointed out that the product "had to be good"
to obtain repeat-purchases by housewives. 58 It emphasized that Clorox,
not Procter & Gamble, had the know-how in the HLB business, as
evidenced by Clorox's success.59 Furthermore, Clorox's finances were
entirely adequate to compete in its field. 6 Procter & Gamble could
obtain discounts in advertising and promotion, but "the fact that a
54There are product-extension mergers and there are product-extension merg-
ers; and they are not all exactly alike. I agree that, for purposes of general
descriptive classification, the acquisitions in both this case [General Foods]
and in Clorox could be called product-extension mergers. But the label
cannot resolve the question of legality. It no more follows that every product-
extension merger is illegal than that every such merger is legal.
ld. at 22,746. (Emphasis added.)
55Unlike the product-extension merger in this case, the one before us in
Clorox, as the Commission's detailed analysis abundantly demonstrated, had
many of the same effects on competition as a conventional horizontal merger.
... In a fundamental sense, the merger in Clorox eliminated direct (one might
even call it horizontal) competition between Procter and Clorox....
Ibid.
56FTC Dkt. No. 6901, at 25,400 (1966).
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merger may result in some economies is no reason to condemn it." 61
The court refused to consider Procter & Gamble as a potential com-
petitor because it found no evidence that Procter & Gamble had
planned to enter the liquid bleach market on its own.
6 2
Looking at post-acquisition evidence offered by Procter & Gamble,
the court emphasized that, in the four years following the merger,
other producers were "selling more bleach for more money than ever
before." 63 There had been no significant change in Clorox's market
share, 64 and Procter & Gamble had not changed over from Clorox
distributors to its own salesmen.,
In conclusion, the court expressed its opinion that the size of
Procter & Gamble, which "pervades the entire opinion of the Commis-
sion," appeared to be the motivating factor which influenced the Com-
mission to invalidate the merger.66 The court recognized that the
case presented a challenge "'to devise tests more precisely adjusted to
the special dangers to a competitive economy posed by the conglom-
erate merger' "67 but was of the opinion that "these tests should
[not] involve application of a per se rule." 6s
Three aspects of the court's opinion deserve special consideration.
Firstly, although the Federal Trade Commission went to great lengths
to fully explain the significance of its characterization of this merger
as a product-extension conglomerate, the court made no attempt to
distinguish this merger from any other in the general class of con-
glomerate mergers. No investigation was made as to the possible sig-
nificance of such a distinction. Secondly, although the Federal Trade
Commission relied upon the close functional relationship between the
products of Procter & Gamble and those of Clorox as an essential
feature of each of its contentions that the merger violated section 7,
the court disposed of each contention without once referring to this
alleged relationship. Tlirdly, the Federal Trade Commission, both in
its final order and in its brief before the Court of Appeals, expressly
disclaimed any contention that this merger should be judged by a
size per se standard. The Commission argued that the violation of
611d. at 81. The Court refused to assume that Procter & Gamble would use its
huge advertising and promotion resources to wipe out its competition in the house-
hold liquid bleach market. Id. at 81, n.1.
62358 F.2d at 79.
631d. at 80.
641bid.
651bid.
661d. at 84.
67bid.
681bid.
